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ABSTRACT
The contribution made by innovation and new technologies to economic growth and welfare is
largely determined by the rate and manner by which innovations diffuse throughout the relevant
population, but this topic has been a somewhat neglected one in the economics of innovation. This
chapter, written for a handbook on innovation, provides a historical and comparative perspective on
diffusion that looks at the broad determinants of diffusion, economic, social, and institutional,
viewed from a microeconomic perspective. A framework for thinking about these determinants is
presented along with a brief nontechnical review of modeling strategies used in different social
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  Innovation and Diffusion 
Bronwyn H. Hall
1 
1.  Introduction 
In 1953, a young female Macaque monkey in the south of Japan washed a muddy 
sweet potato in a stream before eating it. This obvious improvement in food preparation was 
imitated quickly by other monkeys and in less than 10 years it became the norm in her 
immediate group; by 1983, the method had diffused completely. In 1956, the same monkey 
innovated again, inventing a technique in which handfuls of mixed sand and wheat grains 
were cast upon the sea, so that the floating cereal could be skimmed from the surface. Again, 
by 1983, this method of gleaning wheat had diffused almost completely throughout the local 
populations of Macaques.
2 Besides the obvious fact that humankind does not have a 
monopoly on innovation, these examples illustrate a couple of things about the diffusion of 
innovations: first, when they are clearly better than what went before, new ideas of how to do 
things will usually spread via a “learning by observing” process, and second, the process can 
take some time; in these cases it took thirty years, and the life cycle of the Macaque monkey 
is somewhat shorter than ours (Kawai, Watanabe, and Mori 1992). 
 
Turning to the world of humans, it is safe to say that without diffusion, innovation 
would have little social or economic impact. In the study of innovation, the word diffusion is 
commonly used to describe the process by which individuals and firms in a society/economy 
adopt a new technology, or replace an older technology with a newer. But diffusion is not 
only the means by which innovations become useful by being spread throughout a 
                                                 
1 University of California at Berkeley, Scuola Sant’anna Superiore Pisa, NBER, and the Institute of 
Fiscal Studies, London. I am grateful to Beethika Khan for contributing some of the literature review that lies 
behind the issues discussed in this paper, and other contributors to this volume, especially my discussants, 
Kristine Bruland, John Cantwell, and Ove Granstrand, for their very helpful comments. Finally I owe an 
immense debt to the editors of this volume (Jan Fagerberg, David Mowery, and Richard Nelson) for their 
careful reading of multiple drafts of this chapter. 
2 I am grateful to Chris E. Hall for calling this example to my attention. It is described in McGrew 
(1998), where a more complete set of references to the anthropological literature is given. A third feature of this Hall on Diffusion    December 2003 
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population, it is also an intrinsic part of the innovation process, as learning, imitation, and 
feedback effects which arise during the spread of a new technology enhance the original 
innovation.
3 Understanding the diffusion process is the key to understanding how conscious 
innovative activities conducted by firms and governmental institutions, activities such as 
funding research and development, transferring technology, launching new products or 
creating new processes, produce the improvements in economic and social welfare that is 
usually the end goal of these activities. For entities which are “catching up,” such as 
developing economies, backward regions, or technologically laggard firms, diffusion can be 
the most important part of the innovative process.
4 
 
Thirty years ago, an economic historian (Rosenberg 1976) made the following 
observation about the diffusion of innovations: 
“in the history of diffusion of many innovations, one cannot help being struck by two 
characteristics of the diffusion process: its apparent overall slowness on the one hand, and the 
wide variations in the rates of acceptance of different inventions, on the other.” (Rosenberg, 
1976, p. 191). 
  
Empirical measurement and study since then has confirmed this view. This chapter 
and the references included in it review the diffusion of a number of inventions and 
innovative processes, from the boiling of water to prevent diarrheal diseases to mobile 
telephony in Europe. Both these studies and the figures showing diffusion rates in various 
countries demonstrate the truth of Rosenberg’s statement. The studies go further than simply 
noting the speed and variation of diffusion, in that they correlate the rates of adoption with 
characteristics of the technologies and their potential adopters in an attempt to explain the 
speed of diffusion and the ultimate acceptance of the new product. Besides the wide variation 
in acceptance of innovations, a second important characteristic of the diffusion process is the 
                                                                                                                                                        
example, perhaps not directly relevant to this chapter, may be noted: the fact that once having innovated, 
innovators tend to innovate again.  
3 As discussed in the introduction to this volume, the view that every adopter develops and adapts an 
invention to his own use has led some of the literature to refer to adoption itself as “innovation.” I will follow 
the more conventional practice of reserving the term innovation for the first “public” use of a new product, 
process, or practice.  
4 See Godinho and Fagerberg (this volume) on the role of adoption of new technology in the catch-up 
process and in long run economic growth.  Hall on Diffusion    December 2003 
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way in which it interacts with the innovative process. This has perhaps been a somewhat less 
studied aspect of diffusion, owing to the difficulty of collecting systematic data, but case 
studies abound. Rosenberg (1982), among others, has emphasized the fact that the diffusion 
of innovations is often accompanied by learning about their use in different environments, 
and that this in turn feeds back to improvements in the original innovation.  
 
Why is diffusion sometimes slow? Why is it faster in some countries or regions than 
others, and for some innovations than for others? What factors explain the wide variation in 
the rate at which it occurs? This chapter provides a historical and comparative perspective on 
diffusion that looks at the broad determinants, economic, social, and institutional. The ways 
in which the different social scientific disciplines think about diffusion is discussed and a 
framework is presented for studying its determinants. Some of the empirical evidence on 
these determinants is reviewed, and a range of examples given. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of gaps in our understanding and future research questions.  
2.  Conceptual frameworks  
The diffusion of innovations has been studied from a number of different 
perspectives: historical, sociological, economic (including business strategy and marketing), 
and network theoretical. The choice of approach is often dictated by the use to which the 
results will be put, but there is no doubt that insights from one perspective can inform the 
research in another discipline. Perhaps a key example of this is the way in which historical 
study of the development and spread of certain major inventions has affected how economists 
understand the role of the diffusion process in determining the dynamics of productivity 
change, a topic I return to later in this chapter. First I lay out some of the frameworks that 
have been used by different disciplines for the analysis of diffusion.  
 
The sociological and organizational literature is exemplified by Rogers’ well-known 
book, Diffusion of Innovations, now in its fourth edition. In this book, he reviews the subject 
primarily from a sociological perspective, but one that is informed by research on 
organizations, the role of economic factors, and the strategies of firms and development 
agencies. Rogers provides a useful set of five analytic categories that classify the attributes 
that influence the potential adopters of an innovation: 
1)  the relative advantage of the innovation. Hall on Diffusion    December 2003 
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2)  its compatibility, with the potential adopter’s current way of doing things and with 
social norms. 
3)  the complexity of the innovation. 
4)  trialability, the ease with which the innovation can be tested by a potential 
adopter. 
5)  observability, the ease with which the innovation can be evaluated after trial. 
 
Most of these attributes are recognizable in one form or another in the many analyses 
of specific innovations that have undertaken by researchers in the past, albeit under different 
names. For example, both trialability and observability are characteristics that speak directly 
to the level of uncertainty faced by a potential adopter. The latter characteristic is a key 
feature of the real options model of technology choice which is discussed later in this chapter 
and which underlies some of the work on technology adoption by business firms. Complexity 
as a determinant is clearly related to the economist’s notions of cost and complementary 
investment, as is relative advantage, which an economist might consider to be determined 
primarily by the benefit/cost ratio of adopting the new technology.  
 
But understanding the way in which the diffusion process unfolds, in addition to 
simply identifying features that determine its ultimate success or failure, requires a larger 
framework, one also provided by Rogers later in the same volume. In addition to the 
attributes listed above, which influence the adoption decision at the individual level, he points 
to a variety of external or social conditions that may accelerate or slow the process:  
1)  whether the decision is made collectively, by individuals, or by a central 
authority. 
2)  the communication channels used to acquire information about an 
innovation, whether mass media or interpersonal. 
3)  the nature of the social system in which the potential adopters are 
embedded, its norms, and the degree of interconnectedness. 
4)  the extent of change agents’ (advertisers, development agencies, etc.) 
promotion efforts. 
 
Like so many students of the diffusion process, Rogers implicitly assumes that neither 
the new innovation nor the technology it replaces changes during the diffusion process and 
that the new is better than the old. These assumptions have been challenged strongly by Hall on Diffusion    December 2003 
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Rosenberg (1972, 1982), who argued that not only was the new technology improved as user 
experience and feedback accumulated, but also that frequently the replaced technology 
experienced a “last gasp” improvement due to competitive pressure and that this fact could 
slow the diffusion of the new. A frequently given example is the rapid productivity increase 
in sailing ships during the nineteenth century documented by Gilfillan (1935a, 1935b).  
  
In contrast to the focus on the external environment favored by sociologists and 
students of organizational behavior, many economists have tended to view the process as the 
cumulative or aggregate result of a series of (rational) individual calculations that weigh the 
incremental benefits of adopting a new technology against the costs of change, often in an 
environment characterized by uncertainty (as to the future path of the technology and its 
benefits) and by limited information (about both the benefits and costs and even about the 
very existence of the technology). Although the ultimate decision is made by demanders of 
the technology, the benefits and costs are often influenced by decisions made by suppliers of 
the new technology. The resulting diffusion rate is then determined by summing over these 
individual decisions.  
 
The virtue of this approach to thinking about the adoption of innovations is that it is 
grounded in the decision-making of the micro-economic unit, but this virtue comes with a 
cost, in that it ignores the social feedback effects (or externalities, to use the economists’ 
term) that might result from one individual adopting and therefore encouraging another. 
Naturally, in the recent past, economists have risen to this challenge and included such 
concepts as network effects in their models (see the discussion in Box 1). Nevertheless, the 
factors and mechanisms considered in most of their studies typically fall short of many that 
other disciplines might consider important, such as social connectedness. An interesting early 
debate on this topic that reflected different views of the determinants of hybrid-corn adoption 
in the United States was conducted by a pioneering economist in the study of diffusion and a 
number of sociologists including Rogers in the pages of Rural Sociology (Babcock 1962; 
Griliches 1960a,b, 1962; Havens and Rogers 1962; Rogers and Havens 1961).
5 Looking back 
at this debate from today, a reasonable conclusion is that both economic and non-economic 
factors probably mattered for the diffusion of hybrid corn, although economic factors by 
themselves did a pretty good job explaining variation across states.  
                                                 
5 I am grateful to Paul David for calling some of these references to my attention.  Hall on Diffusion    December 2003 
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[Box 1 about here] 
 
As an example of micro-economic analysis of the adoption decision in a modern 
technological setting, consider the decision to replace a wired physical connection to the 
internet with a wireless one, either at home or in an office. Benefits might include the ability 
to work on the network throughout one’s house or workplace rather than at a fixed location 
such as a desk, and the absence of wires. They might also include the fact that several 
members of the household can be online at the same time using a single telephone 
connection. The costs include the purchase of a base station and the services of a technician 
to install it, but they may also include the time of the user (adopter) spent reconfiguring his or 
her computer and ensuring that all the communication tools needed are working. Costs might 
also include the acquisition of new software, or the time spent training other members of the 
household or office in its use. Were we to enrich this story to include the adoption 
environment, we might focus on such factors as whether neighbors or colleagues already had 
undertaken such an installation, the extent to which it has been advertised by the supplier of 
the technology (or the extent to which it has been “sponsored” by a government agency or 
leading firm), and even the state of development of the new technology and the operating 
system necessary to use it (a complementary input). Note also that most of these factors have 
been changing rapidly over time. 
 
As alluded to earlier, the first empirical study of the diffusion of technology by an 
economist was Griliches (1957) study of the diffusion of hybrid corn seed in the Midwestern 
United States. This study emphasized the role of economic factors such as expected profits 
and scale in determining the varying rates of diffusion across the Midwestern states. At the 
same time, it found that the variation in initial start dates for the process depended on the 
speed with which the seed was customized for use in particular geographic areas. That is, 
diffusion depended to a certain extent on the activities of the suppliers of the technology in 
adapting it to local conditions, again highlighting the tendency for the fundamental 
characteristics of the technology to change somewhat during the adoption process. This 
theme is repeated throughout the history of innovation. Bruland (1998, 2002) finds that the 
nineteenth century development of the Norwegian textile industry was greatly facilitated by 
the technology transfer activities undertaken by the mostly British machinery suppliers in the 
form of training, increasing the supply of skilled workers in Norway.  Hall on Diffusion    December 2003 
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The marketing literature on diffusion is primarily focused on two questions: how to 
encourage consumers and customers to purchase new products or technologies, and how to 
detect or forecast success in the marketplace. That is, it often looks for factors that can be 
influenced in order to increase the number of agents that will choose a particular product. For 
this reason, the literature tends to emphasize factors such as media information or the role of 
social networks and change agents, as well as the characteristics of the product itself, rather 
than individual adopter factors such as education and income levels that are less subject to 
manipulation by the marketing organization. The workhorse model in marketing for many 
years has been the Bass (1969) model, which assumes that mass media are important early on 
in the diffusion process but that as time passes, interpersonal communication becomes far 
more important. Estimation of this model on a number of consumer durables has revealed 
that interpersonal communication plays a much bigger role than the media in diffusion 
(Rogers 1995). For an interesting discussion of the contrast between the economic and 
marketing views and a comparison of models from the two literatures, see Zettelmeyer and 
Stoneman (1993). Recent work on identifying and forecasting success in the marketing 
literature is illustrated by Golder and Tellis (1997). I defer discussion of their model to later 
in this chapter when I discuss some of the findings obtained by Tellis, Stremersch, and Yin 
(2002) using this methodology.  
 
The activist view of diffusion taken by the marketing literature is also that pursued by 
specialists in technology policy, who are generally interested in encouraging the adoption of 
particular new technologies for welfare-enhancing reasons, either because it serves particular 
public policy goals (such as encouraging the boiling of water to reduce disease in less-
developed countries) or because certain technologies are viewed as conferring externalities 
on society as a whole (such as the adoption of internet use or vaccination against a 
communicable disease). In understanding the variation across countries in diffusion, variables 
describing their institutions and culture have proved essential in some cases (but not all, see 
the discussion of Tellis, Stremersch, and Yin 2002 in section 18.5).  
3.  Modeling diffusion 
The most important thing to observe about the decision to adopt a new invention is 
that at any point in time the choice being made is not a choice between adopting and not 
adopting but a choice between adopting now or deferring the decision until later. It is Hall on Diffusion    December 2003 
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important to look at the decision in this way is because of the nature of the benefits and costs. 
By and large, the benefits from adopting a new technology, as in the wireless 
communications example given above, are flow benefits that are received throughout the life 
of the acquired innovation. However, the costs, especially those of the non-pecuniary 
“learning” type, are typically incurred at the time of adoption and cannot be recovered. There 
may be an ongoing fee for using some types of new technology, but it is usually much less 
than the initial cost. Economists call costs of this type “sunk.” That is, ex ante, a potential 
adopter weighs the fixed costs of adoption against the benefits he expects, but ex post, these 
fixed costs are irrelevant because a great part of them have been sunk and cannot be 
recovered.  
 
The argument that adoption is characterized by sunk costs implies two stylized facts 
about the adoption of new technologies: first, adoption is usually an absorbing state, in the 
sense that we rarely observe a new technology being abandoned in favor of an old one.
6 This 
is because the decision to adopt faces a large benefit minus cost hurdle; once this hurdle is 
passed, the costs are sunk and the decision to abandon requires giving up the benefit without 
regaining the cost, so even if the gross benefit is reduced relative to what was expected, the 
net benefit is still likely to be positive. Second, under uncertainty about the benefits of the 
new technology, there is an option value to waiting before sinking the costs of adoption, 
which may tend to delay adoption.
7  
 
An important exception to the rule that adoption is normally an absorbing state is the 
possibility of fads or fashions, which might be defined as things such as the “hula hoop” 
craze or various types of weight loss diets, which diffuse rapidly and then disappear after a 
time. The experience of a wave of adoption followed by a wave of disuse seems to be 
somewhat more likely in the case of innovations in “practice,” such as medical practice or 
business practice, than in the case of physical products, possibly because in the latter case the 
costs that are sunk are out of pocket costs paid to others, whereas in the former much of the 
                                                 
6 Although see Rogers (2000) for some examples of innovations that failed to diffuse because they 
were rejected after trial.  
7 An option is a choice between doing nothing and paying a fixed amount to purchase an uncertain 
return. It is real (as opposed to financial) if it involves investment in real assets. In this setting, the investment is Hall on Diffusion    December 2003 
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cost (although by no means all) comes in the form of the adopter’s time and effort. That is, 
the possibility of sunk costs may loom larger to the adopter when denominated in dollar or 
euro symbols. Nelson et al 2002 discusses this phenomenon more fully and gives some 
examples (such as the quality circle movement). These authors place considerable emphasis 
on the difficulty in these cases of getting feedback that the innovation truly is an 
improvement. Relatively low sunk costs combined with uncertain benefits will mean that the 
decision to adopt is more easily reversible in the case of practices. Strang and Soule (1993) 
also discuss the cyclicality of fashions in business practices.  
 
It is a well-known fact that when the number of users of a new product or invention is 
plotted versus time, the resulting curve is typically an S-shaped or ogive distribution. The not 
very surprising implication is that adoption proceeds slowly at first, accelerates as it spreads 
throughout the potential adopting population, and then slows down as the relevant population 
becomes saturated. In fact, the S-shape is a natural implication of the observation that 
adoption is usually an absorbing state. Figure 1, which represents the diffusion of electric 
motors in U.S. manufacturing between 1898 and 1955, shows such a curve. In 1898, the share 
of manufacturing horsepower produced by electric motors was about 4 percent. It increased 
steadily and smoothly between 1900 and about 1940, at which point nearly all horsepower is 
produced by electricity. Saturation appears to be reached at around 90 percent, presumably 
because for some specialized uses, other types of motors are preferred. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Looked at in terms of the benefits and costs of technology adoption, a range of simple 
assumptions will generate this curve. The two leading models explain the dispersion in 
adoption times using two different mechanisms: consumer heterogeneity, or consumer 
learning. The heterogeneity model assumes that different consumers expect to receive 
different benefits from the innovation. If the distribution of benefits over consumers is normal 
(or approximately normal, that is unimodal with a central tendency), the cost of the new 
product is constant or declines monotonically over time, and it is assumed that consumers 
                                                                                                                                                        
the adoption of a new technology, which has uncertain benefits and costs that may change over time. The option 
value arises from the fact that waiting may reduce the chance that the wrong decision is made.  Hall on Diffusion    December 2003 
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adopt when the benefit they receive for the product is greater than its cost, the diffusion curve 
for the product will have the familiar S-shape.  
 
An important alternative model is a learning or epidemic model, which is more 
popular in the sociological and marketing literatures (the Bass model is an exemplar), but has 
also been used by economists. In this model, consumers can have identical tastes and the cost 
of the new technology can be constant over time, but not all consumers are informed about 
the new technology at the same time. Because each consumer learns about the technology 
from his or her neighbor, as time passes, more and more people adopt the technology during 
any period, leading to an increasing rate of adoption. However, eventually the market 
becomes saturated, and the rate decreases again. This too will generate an S-shaped curve for 
the diffusion rate.
8 In general, combining this model with the previous model simply 
reinforces the S-shape of the curve. Golder and Tellis (1997) define a concept they call “take-
off,” which is their attempt to identify the point at which the empirical diffusion curve 
appears to have its greatest inflection relative to the initial growth rate.
9 For the data in Figure 
1, this point would be in about 1910. Because for many consumer products the existence of 
such a point is a good predictor of eventual success, the focus of their work is to identify 
predictors of this point. 
 
Regardless of the details of the mechanism generating the probability distribution of 
adoption times, the question which concerns both social scientists and those interested in 
encouraging the spread of new technologies is the question of what factors affect the rates at 
which these events occur. A second and no less interesting question is what are the 
determinants of the ceiling at which the S-curve asymptotes. That is, when would we expect 
this ceiling to be less than one hundred percent of the potential user base?  The next section 
of this chapter reviews these factors and some of the empirical evidence concerning their 
importance.  
                                                 
8 For a good presentation of this class of models and their extensions, see Geroski (2000).  David 
(2003) provides an evolutionary interpretation of this mechanism.   
9 For any particular parametric distribution function, this point might be defined at the point where the 
curvature of the cumulative distribution (the second derivative) is maximized. Such a point is well-defined if it 
exists. It occurs when about 20 per cent of the population has adopted in the case of a logit and when about 15 
per cent have adopted in the case of a normal. Golder and Tellis (1997) define a non-parametric discrete version 
of this measure by looking at the current rate of adoption as a share of adoption to date.  Hall on Diffusion    December 2003 
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4.  Determinants of the diffusion rate 
Figure 2 shows the number of U.S. households that have adopted particular new 
inventions as a function of time. Although not smooth, these curves clearly follow the S-
shaped pattern noted by many observers. They also exhibit the characteristic wide variation in 
the elapsed time for diffusion. For example, it took over 40 years for the clothes washer to go 
from one quarter of all households to three quarters, whereas it took less than 10 years for the 
video cassette recorder or color television (not shown) to make the same leap. Table 1 shows 
the diffusion of common household electronic appliances in Japan between 1989 and 1995. It 
is noteworthy that there is considerable variation in the diffusion rates for different products 
even during the same six-year period, and this variation is not explained by the level of 
diffusion that was already achieved in 1989 (compare the refrigerator to the air conditioner, 
or the CD/cassette/radio player to the video camera).  
 
[Figure 2, Table 1 about here] 
 
From the considerations reviewed earlier in the chapter, one can derive a list of 
factors that might be expected to influence the diffusion of innovations. These can be 
classified into four main groups, those that affect the benefits received, those that affect the 
costs of adoption, those related to the industry or social environment, and those due to 
uncertainty and information problems. Alternatively, using the classification system of 
Rogers, one can identify the first and second as combining to yield relative advantage and 
complexity, the third as compatibility, and the fourth as being determined by trialability and 
observability.  
 
4.1. Benefit received from the new technology 
Clearly the most important determinant of the benefit derived from adopting a new 
technology is the amount of improvement which the new technology offers over any previous 
technology. This is to a great extent determined by the extent to which there exist substitute 
older technologies that are fairly close. For example, in Figure 1, we see that radio and the 
automatic clothes washer were both introduced in the United States in the early twenties, but 
that diffusion of the former was much more rapid than the latter. This may be partly because 
a fairly good substitute for the automatic clothes washer in the form of manual clothes Hall on Diffusion    December 2003 
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washing machines existed whereas there was no very good substitute for radio. It is also 
consistent with the Tellis et al (2002) finding that across European countries during the latter 
half of the twentieth century, the single most important factor that explains speed of diffusion 
is whether the good in question is “white” (household appliance) or “brown” (entertainment 
or information consumer durable). These authors hypothesize that the general explanation for 
this finding is that “brown” goods are more status-enhancing, in that they are more readily 
observable to non-members of the household. Unfortunately they did not control for the 
prices of the goods because of lack of consistent data across countries, so it is difficult to 
know whether this finding might also be related to differences in the full costs of adoption 
across goods and countries. 
 
An important factor in explaining the slowness of technology adoption is the fact that 
the relative advantage of new technologies is frequently rather small when they are first 
introduced. As many authors have emphasized, as diffusion proceeds learning about the 
technology takes place, the innovation is improved and adapted to different environments, 
thus making it more attractive to a wider set of adopters (Rosenberg 1976; Nelson et al 2002). 
The implication is that the benefits to adoption generally increase over time; if they increase 
faster than costs, diffusion will appear to be delayed (because the number of potential 
adopters will increase over time, expanding the size of the adopting population). In the 
Rosenberg (1982) study, the leading example was the airframe, specifically the stretching of 
the Boeing 747, but in fact one could argue that any technology in which learning by doing or 
using is an important aspect of its development will display feedback between diffusion and 
innovation. A good example might be applications software, most of whose development 
after initial launch is dictated by the experience and demands of users, or the worldwide web, 
where enhancements after the first web browser was created were dramatic.  
 
4.2. Network effects 
Increasingly, the value of some new technology to the consumer depends on partly on 
the extent to which it is adopted by other consumers, either because the technology is used to 
communicate with others (such as the internet, or instant messaging) or because the provision 
of software and services for the technology depends on the existence of a large customer 
base. Goods of this type are usually termed network goods by economists: their chief 
characteristic is that they rely on standards to ensure that they can communicate either Hall on Diffusion    December 2003 
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directly or indirectly. For these goods, an important determinant of the benefit of adoption is 
therefore the current or expected network size. 
 
For example, Saloner and Shepard (1995) examine the adoption of ATM machines by 
banks, under the assumptions that consumers prefer a larger network of ATM machines to a 
smaller and that banks respond to consumer preference. These authors do indeed find that 
banks with more branches adopt an ATM network sooner, even after controlling for overall 
bank size, and argue that this confirms that a higher network value leads to earlier adoption of 
a new technology, other things equal.
10 This example illustrates both the importance of 
networks and also the role of large firms as intermediates between technology and consumers 
in sponsoring particular standards for networks.  
 
A famous example of the role of “network externalities” in consumer adoption of new 
technologies is the VHS/Beta competition, which resulted eventually in a single standard for 
video recorder/players in a large part of the world. Most observers attribute this outcome to 
the consumer desire for a large range of software in the form of pre-recorded tapes to go with 
this hardware, and to the fact that VHS had an initial early advantage in the length of program 
that could be recorded. See Park (1998) for details on the diffusion of this technology to 
consumers. 
 
Although network effects (particularly those from networks that diffuse knowledge 
about or experience with an innovation) have always been viewed as important for the 
diffusion of innovations, especially in the sociological literature, recent work in economics 
has focused on the role played by standards in accelerating or slowing the diffusion process, 
as in the VHS/Beta example (David 1985; Katz and Shapiro 1985; Arthur 1989; Economides 
and Himmelberg 1995). The central message of the modern economic literature on standards 
and network externalities is that consumers and firms receive benefits from the fact that other 
consumers and or firms have chosen the same technology that they have. These benefits are 
viewed as being of two kinds, direct and indirect. Direct network benefits are those that arise 
because they allow the adopter to communicate with others using the same technology. 
Examples are the choice of fax communication technology or the choice of word processor 
                                                 
10 On the adoption of ATM systems, see also Hannan and McDowell (1984a,b), who emphasize the 
role of bank size and industry concentration, which are chiefly cost side and market structure considerations. Hall on Diffusion    December 2003 
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document format. Indirect benefits arise from the fact that adoption of a product that uses a 
particular technological standard by a greater number of people increases the probability that 
the standard will survive and that goods compatible with that standard will continue to be 
produced. The VHS/Beta example alluded to earlier can be viewed as an example where 
indirect network benefits were very important, although direct benefits presumably also play 
a part (the benefits from being able to loan a video made on one’s own machine to a friend or 
neighbor).  
 
The close connection between technological standards and network externalities 
comes from the fact that standards create a number of effects all of which go in the direction 
of making it more likely that a good will exhibit network externalities. First, a technological 
standard increases the probability that communication between two products such as 
telephones, instant messaging services, or a CD player and a CD, will be successful. Second, 
standards ease consumer learning and encourage adoption when the same or similar standards 
are used in a range of products. The use of a particular standard, such as a Windows 
operating system, by others in a consumer’s network, also helps learning and will encourage 
adoption, because of the relative ease with which a new adopter can obtain advice from those 
nearby. Third, a successful standard increases the size of the potential market for a good, 
which can be important in lowering the cost of its production and in increasing the variety 
and availability of complementary goods. Besides the VHS/Beta example referred to earlier, 
an example of this latter effect might be the wider availability of software for the Windows 
operating system, in comparison to Macintosh OS or Linux.  
 
Although standards have always mattered for diffusion, the increasing importance of 
digital and information technologies have increased their salience and lead to a variety of 
“standards battles” and to strategic behavior on the part of firms that hope to influence their 
adoption. Earlier examples of standards battles are the competition between AC and DC 
methods of distributing electricity (David 1990a), and the failure of gas-powered refrigerators 
to succeed in the market despite their apparent efficiency, because of the sponsorship of 
electric power by GE and Westinghouse (Rogers 1995). Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
importance of this phenomenon has increased recently, with increase in information and 
communication technologies. Consider for example, the battle between Netscape and 
Microsoft Internet Explorer for dominance in the web browser market.  
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The increase in the importance of standards that has accompanied the growth in 
importance of the information and telecommunications industries has led to a wave of 
economic modeling. These models incorporate the increasing returns phenomenon that 
results from the positive feedback from installed base to adoption by other consumers. An 
early effort is that by Arthur, Ermoliev, and Kaniovski (1983), which emphasizes David’s 
insight that where there are multiple possible standards, small events early in the process that 
favor one of the standards can lead to an adoption process that settles on an inferior standard. 
By adding heterogeneity in consumer’s tastes or localization in information spillovers, later 
researchers have produced more complex models of diffusion in the presence of network 
externalities that results in more than one standard surviving in the market even in the 
presence of increasing returns in adoption (Bassanini and Dosi 1998; Wendt and van Westarp 
2000). 
 
Industrial organization and strategy theorists have centered their modeling efforts on 
the implications of increasing returns in adoption for competitive strategy and market 
structure. Examples of this literature include Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986, 1994), Farrell 
and Saloner (1992), and Shapiro and Varian (1999). In a series of papers, Katz and Shapiro 
have explored the implications of consumer adoption behavior in the presence of network 
externalities for the strategic interactions among firms offering competing products. In 
general, the theoretical literature of which these papers are an example identifies multiple 
possible equilibria among firms competing in such environments, so that it is difficult to draw 
firm conclusions.  
 
Farrell and Saloner study the speed of diffusion (relative to the socially optimal rate) 
when the good in question is subject to network externalities, so that early adopters ignore the 
consequence of their adoption on future adopters and on the users of the previous technology. 
They show that in this setting, diffusion can be either too fast (excess momentum) or too slow 
(excess inertia). Finally, the book by Shapiro and Varian draws out the implications of these 
various theoretical models for the production and marketing of information goods (broadly 
defined), many of which exhibit the properties that give rise to network externalities. They 
describe strategies for competing in markets where network externalities are important and 
where it is important to win standards battles because losing them means business failure.   
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4.3. Costs of adopting the new technology 
The second main class of factors affecting the decision to adopt new technology are 
those related to its cost. This includes not only the price of acquisition, but more importantly 
the cost of the complementary investment and learning required to make use of the 
technology. Such investment may include training of workers and the purchase of necessary 
capital equipment (whose diffusion is therefore affected by the same factors). It is difficult to 
overemphasize the importance of this point about the need for complementary investment, 
especially for complex modern technology that requires the re-organization of the process 
that will use it (see Lam, this volume, for more on this topic).  
 
For example, in a series of recent papers Eric Brynjolfsson has argued that the full 
cost of adopting new computer information systems based on networked personal computers 
is about ten times the cost of the hardware.
11 Greenan and Guellec (1998) use data on French 
firms and workers to make a similar point, that the effective adoption of ICT requires 
organizational change as well, and that this raises the cost of adoption, which slows diffusion. 
Caselli and Coleman (2001) compare the rates of computer investment across OECD 
countries between 1970 and 1990 and highlight the importance both of worker skill level and 
of complementary capital investments in determining the rate of purchase of new computing 
systems. The implication of this work is that the use of new computing technology requires 
both the training of workers and the installation of related equipment (for example, 
remodeling expenses for space to install servers, along with the necessary cooling 
equipment). The need for complementary investment therefore has two effects: it slows 
diffusion because it raises the cost, and because this type of investment usually takes time, it 
slows down the rate at which the benefits of the new technology are seen by the firm and the 
economy in the form of increased productivity.  
 
David (1990b) has argued that a similar adjustment took place in manufacturing 
industry use of electric power, which took 40 years to diffuse completely in the United States 
(also see Figure 1 and Mowery and Rosenberg 1998). The installation of electric power in a 
factory required a complete redesign of its layout and a change in task allocation, which 
meant that adopting this new technology was a rather costly process, and tended to occur 
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slowly, or when green field investment was being undertaken. David argues that a similar re-
organization of workflow takes place when computer technology is introduced into the 
workplace or when internet-based processing replaces telephone or mail order processing. 
Recent productivity growth evidence in the United States appears to confirm the view that 
major technological-organizational change takes time for its effects to be felt (Gordon 2003; 
Economist 2003).  
 
Shaw (2002) has documented this kind of phenomenon in the replacement of manual 
monitoring of production lines in continuous hot steel production lines by computerized 
pulpit operation. Not only does this involve a substantial investment in high technology 
equipment, but it also requires fewer workers with substantially higher cognitive skills. 
Where they used to be on the production line working physically with the machinery, they are 
now in small rooms (“pulpits”) above the line, monitoring and adjusting the process using 
computer technology.  
 
Technology producers often try to subsidize the adoption of new technologies by 
providing free training and other help to (potential) users and by charging reduced 
introductory rates for a certain period. Another symptom of the desire of innovating firms to 
reimburse new customers for their sunk costs in previous technologies is the widespread 
practice among software firms of offering competitive upgrades to owners of rival products 
as well as to the owners of their own products. For a more complete discussion of strategies 
used by technology producers to encourage diffusion and increase the installed base of their 
product, see Shapiro and Varian (1999). 
 
Because most of the costs of adoption are fixed, firms’ choices to change or introduce 
technologies may be influenced by their own scale and by the market structure of the industry 
within which they operate. An interesting example of this phenomenon is given by Paul 
David in a series of papers on the introduction of the mechanical reaper in U. S. and British 
agriculture in the 19
th century (David 1975a,b). He argues persuasively that adoption was 
delayed in Britain relative to the United States for two reasons: first, because the reaper was a 
fixed cost investment, profitability required a farm and fields of a certain size, and second, 
because it was incompatible with the typically British pattern of small fields divided by 
hedgerows. In addition to the difference between countries, he also finds that diffusion was Hall on Diffusion    December 2003 
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delayed in the U.S. itself until the price of labor rose to a level that made the investment in 
the reaper (a labor-saving device) profitable.  
 
In the present day context, a similar empirical finding can be found in many studies of 
diffusion. Majumdar and Vankataraman (1998) looked at the replacement of mechanical 
switching by electronic switching in the U.S. telecommunications industry and found that 
larger firms adopted first, presumably because the costs per customer were somewhat lower. 
Note that even when technology adoption involves an investment in equipment that is 
proportional to the existing size of the firm, the requirement that the firm have sufficient 
absorptive capacity, and the need for worker training or other complementary changes may 
create a fixed cost that is not proportional to firm size.  
 
As in the case of investment in innovation, firm investment in new technologies is 
also sensitive to financial factors. As was suggested earlier, the decision to adopt new 
technology is fundamentally an investment decision made in an uncertain environment, and 
therefore we should not be surprised to find that all the arguments for a relationship between 
sources of finance and choice of investment strategy that have been advanced in the 
investment literature have a role to play here. The chapter by O’Sullivan in this volume 
reviews these financial factors in some detail. For example, Mansfield (1968) reports that the 
adoption of diesel locomotives by railways depends somewhat on their liquidity, implying 
these firms faced a higher cost of external than internal finance.  
 
4.4. Information and uncertainty 
The choice to adopt a new technology requires knowledge that it exists and some 
information about its suitability to the potential adopter’s situation. Therefore an important 
determinant of diffusion is information about the new technology, which may be influenced 
by the actions of the supplier of the new technology. Obviously in many cases this takes the 
form of advertising, which influences the cost of the new technology directly. The choice to 
adopt may also depend on the information available about experience with the technology in 
the decision maker’s immediate environment, either from those in geographic proximity or 
from those with whom he or she interacts.  
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Because benefits for adoption are spread over time while costs are usually incurred at 
the beginning, expectations about the length of life of either the technology or the adopter 
will matter. Uncertainty about benefits, costs, or length of life will slow the rate of adoption, 
and may often turn the decision problem into an options-like computation. As discussed 
earlier, the latter is a consequence of the fact that in most cases, once a new technology has 
been chosen, the costs are sunk and cannot be recovered. That is, the potential adopter has an 
option on new technology; if he sees the uncertain payoff reach a certain value (the strike 
price), he will exercise the option by adopting the technology (see Stoneman 2001b for a 
theoretical development).  
 
Empirical work on diffusion that incorporates real options is rather scarce, although 
descriptive work that confirms the role of trialability and observability is widespread (for 
some recent examples, see Nelson et al 2002). One notable example of an investigation of 
technology adoption as the exercise of an option is that of Luque (2002). She looks at the 
decision by U.S. plants to adopt three advanced manufacturing technologies, and finds that 
plants operating in industries with lower degrees of demand and technological uncertainty 
and a thicker resale market (higher resale prices for used machinery) are more likely to adopt 
these technologies. She argues that this confirms the importance of uncertainty in the 
decision; if adopting a new technology corresponds to the exercise of an option, we expect 
adoption to happen more often in industries with lower uncertainty and lower sunk costs.  
 
4.5. Market size, industry environment and market structure 
The relationship between firm size or industry concentration and the adoption of new 
technology by a firm is subject to many of the same considerations as the relationship of 
these factors to innovation. As discussed above, large dominant firms can spread the costs of 
adoption over more units, but also may not feel the pressure to reduce costs that leads to 
investment in new technologies. Empirically, in the case of technology adoption, most studies 
have found that large firms adopt any given technology sooner, but there are some 
exceptions. Oster (1982) found that small firms in the steel industry replaced the open hearth 
furnace with the basic oxygen furnace during the post-World War II period sooner than large 
firms. In a study of 12 major innovations in the coal, rail, iron and steel, and brewing 
industries, Mansfield (1961) found weak evidence that firms in competitive less concentrated Hall on Diffusion    December 2003 
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industries adopted new technologies sooner, as did Romeo (1977) in a study of the diffusion 
of numerically controlled machine tools.  
 
In some cases the adoption of new technology is determined by firms, acting for the 
benefit of consumers and for their own benefit. As an example, consider airline adoption of 
computerized reservation systems. Consumers have little say in this decision although they 
ultimately benefit in the form of lower prices for air travel or better service, such as seat 
reservations. In other cases, the decision fundamentally rests with the consumer, for example 
the choice of video recording technology such as VHS, Beta, and now DVD. Although the 
same considerations of cost versus benefit apply broadly in both cases, the role of market 
structure may be more important in the former case than in the latter, because the adopting 
firms are likely to be few in number and therefore able to interact strategically with respect to 
the adoption decision itself. In the latter case, the strategic interaction occurs in choosing the 
technologies that are offered; in principle, firms can produce the same set of strategic 
outcomes as in the former case (via penetration pricing, etc.), but lack of perfect information 
about consumers’ tastes and limits on their ability to segment the market sufficiently may 
prevent the firms from fully internalizing consumers’ preferences.  
 
Market structure can affect the decision to adopt in two distinct ways: via seller 
behavior and via buyer behavior. Highly concentrated providers of new technology will tend 
to have higher prices, slowing adoption, but they also have the ability to determine a standard 
more easily, increasing the benefit of adoption. If two or more oligopolistic firms are 
competing to offer different standards, we may in fact get too rapid adoption of a new 
technology, because of the incentives they face to price below cost in order to build market 
share (Farrell and Saloner 1992). In the case of potential adopting firms, market 
concentration affects both their ability to pass through any costs to consumers and also the 
incentives they face in incurring the costs of adoption. Many of the issues raised by the 
tension between the fear of displacement and the exercise of market power here are familiar 
from the literature on monopolists’ incentives to innovate (for example, see Gilbert and 
Newberry 1982).  
 
Along with market size and structure, the general regulatory environment will have an 
influence, tending to slow the rate of adoption in some areas due to the relative sluggishness 
of regulatory change and increasing it in others due to the role of the regulator in mandating a Hall on Diffusion    December 2003 
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particular technological standard. As an example of the former situation consider the use of 
plastic pipe for plumbing, which lowers construction cost, but has been slow to diffuse in 
many localities due to existing building codes. As an example of the latter, Mowery and 
Rosenberg (1982) have written about the extent to which airline regulation by the Civil 
Aeronautics Board in the United States was responsible for promoting the adoption of new 
innovation in airframes and jet engines, in its role as standard setter and coordinator for the 
industry.  
 
An important example of the unintended consequences of regulation for diffusion is 
the difference between the United States and Europe (and Japan to some extent) in the 
diffusion of household internet use. Historically, pricing in the U.S. telecommunications 
industry has permitted unlimited local calling at a single monthly rate, whereas pricing for 
local calls in other countries has usually been proportional to usage. These policies are 
largely determined by regulatory bodies, but once in place, are difficult to change because 
consumers and firms adapt to them. In the absence of direct connection to the network such 
as is available in large institutions, household internet use requires the ability to connect over 
local phone lines for extended periods of time. The marginal cost of the internet for 
households is therefore to a great extent determined by the cost of local calling, so diffusion 
of the internet along with email and instant messaging use has been far more rapid in the 
United States than in other countries that are just as developed. Only with the recent advent 
of ISDN service charged by the month in some European countries has household internet 
use begun to spread there. In contrast, the diffusion of various “text-messaging” services on 
wireless phones, which are a form of communication popular with teenagers and similar to 
the internet instant messaging widely used in the U.S., has been more rapid in Japan and 
Europe. Relative costs of the two forms of instant communication, which in turn are due to 
regulatory reasons, are probably the main explanation for the differences.  
5.  Cultural and social determinants 
Economic factors like these can go a long way toward explaining differences in rates 
of diffusion (Griliches 1957 and subsequent authors) but other factors may also be important. 
For example, many have stressed differences in cultural attitudes towards risk and simple 
“newness.”
12 These characteristics can vary within cultures as well as between them, leading 
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to dispersion in adoption rates that are not accounted for by the economic variables. Inter 
alia, Strang and Soule (1998) provide a useful discussion of the cultural basis of diffusion. 
 
Rogers (1995) cites a number of situations where compatibility with existing social 
norms has strongly influenced the adoption of health-related innovations such as the boiling 
of water for consumption or various types of contraceptives in underdeveloped countries, 
whose relative popularity depends greatly on local religious and cultural mores. He cites as 
example where a strong traditional distinction made between the qualities of cold and hot 
water discouraged the use of the very simple preventive measure of boiling water destined for 
human consumption in order to prevent diarrheal diseases.  
 
On the other hand, for consumer household durables, Tellis et al (2002) find that 
variables such as gender, cultural attitudes, religion, etc. have little predictive power for 
“takeoff” on average (across European countries) in the presence of lagged market 
penetration. When these variables are considered separately as predictors, “industriousness” 
(which is measured by a climate variable) and “need for achievement” (which is measured by 
the ratio of Protestants to Catholics in the country) speeds diffusion, and a measure of 
“uncertainty avoidance” slows diffusion. This study is noteworthy in that it includes 
economic, cultural, and communication variables jointly in the same predictive equation.  
6.  Conclusions 
Traditionally, diffusion is one of the three pillars on which the successful introduction 
of new products, processes, and practices into society rests, along with invention (a new idea) 
and commercialization/innovation (reducing the invention to practice). In some ways it is the 
easiest part of the process to study, because it is more predictable from observable factors 
than the other two. Certainly countless studies of the diffusion of individual innovations exist, 
and even exhibit some commonalities (see the references in this paper and in Rogers 1995), 
such as the familiar s-shaped curve, and the importance of both economic factors and social 
networks.  
 
Although many have criticized the linear model that lies behind the division of 
innovative activity into three parts as oversimplified, it remains true that without invention it 
would be difficult to have anything to diffuse, so that the model still serves us as an 
organizing principle, even if we need to be aware of its limitations. Nevertheless, an Hall on Diffusion    December 2003 
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important insight from the many historical case studies of individual inventions has been the 
extent to which the diffusion process enhances an innovation via the feedback of information 
about its operation or utility under varying conditions and across different users, information  
that can be used to improve it. A second major finding from this literature has been the 
possible feedback from differences in the rate or scale of adoption across geographic areas to 
the rates of improvement in the innovation. 
 
In the introduction to this chapter, Rosenberg’s observations on the slowness and 
variability of the diffusion of different innovations were cited. The studies reviewed in this 
chapter have identified some explanations for these observations, such as the size of sunk 
costs (trialability), the adaptations and improvement necessary to make the invention useful 
after its initial conception, and the inherent slowness of interpersonal communication 
networks in spreading information. In the case of major innovations such as electricity or the 
computer, some studies have emphasized that the necessity of reorganizing the workplace to 
take advantage of the new innovation means that diffusion will be greatly delayed, and also 
that the expected gains from innovation may take time to be realized.  
 
Several areas stand out as potentially fruitful for future research. First, most of the 
studies conducted to date have been methodologically rather simple; the most ambitious have 
used a hazard model to correlate the time until adoption with various characteristics of the 
innovation and the adopter (depending on the particular dataset). There is room for an 
approach that is more structural and grounded in the choice problem actually faced by the 
adopter. One promising avenue for modeling is the real options approach suggested by 
Stoneman (2001b); such a model would yield a hazard or waiting time model rather naturally, 
while explicitly incorporating the effects of uncertainty on the decision.
13 The cumulative 
distribution for adoption derived from a hazard model has the familiar S-shape. 
 
Second, although many studies have described the process of innovation enhancement 
during its diffusion qualitatively, there has been relatively little systematic collection of data 
or modeling of the process. Investigations of this type would be very helpful in quantifying 
the importance of this effect, which is similar to but not the same as the well-known learning 
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curve. One technological area where this process has been very important and might be worth 
study is the area of user-driven software development. 
 
Finally, an area of research that is receiving increasing attention in a globalizing 
economy is that concerned with international technology transfer.
14 This literature is generally 
positive (as opposed to normative) in approach and empirically based, focused on identifying 
the mechanisms through which technology diffuses from more developed to less developed 
countries rather than on the adoption choice itself. That is, this analysis is conducted at the 
aggregate level rather than at the level of an individual decision maker. It is probably safe to 
say that there is room for further research in this area, as the diffusion of technology is an 
important source of economic and social development. Indeed, from a welfare perspective, 
one of the most important areas for further study is the comparative diffusion of various 
health and medical practices across developing countries, especially because it is apparent 
that there are wide variations even among similar low income countries in rates of adoption.  
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New Product 1989 1995 Change
Cordless phones  NA 43.7 NA
CD/radio/cassette playe 31.5 68.2 36.7
Convection heater/coole 34.7 57.3 22.6
Washing machine 34.7 55.4 20.7
Word processor 25.1 43.7 18.6
Microwave oven 72.9 89.5 16.6
Video camera 17.5 34.0 16.5
Air conditioner 64.8 79.3 14.5
Automobile 76.6 82.1 5.5
Personal computer 12.4 16.6 4.2
Television 98.4 99.3 0.9
Refrigerator 62.9 63.6 0.7
Source: Japan Echo, Inc. Information Bulletin No.18
Diffusion in Japanese Households (%)
Table 1Hall on Diffusion    December 2003 
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Figure 1 




































































The QWERTY controversy – diffusion with network externalities 
In an influential article published in 1985, Paul David proposed an answer to the 
question of why most keyboards have the QWERTYUIOP layout today, even though 
studies done in the first half of the twentieth century show that those trained on a keyboard 
with the Dvorak layout are able to type more quickly. He attributed this outcome to the 
importance of lock-in where there are network externalities. The argument is that the 
invention of touch typing in the late 1880s made typewriters a network good because of 
the interrelatedness between the keyboard layout and the typist’s skills, the economies of 
scale in the user costs of typewriting due to training, and the quasi-irreversibility of 
investment in learning how to type. By the 1890s, these factors led to a significant lock-in 
to QWERTY layout, because it was easier to reconfigure the keyboard than to retrain the 
typist. The conclusion from this story of the diffusion of a new technology with network 
characteristics is that it is possible that the version of technology adopted (the “standard”) 
was not the necessarily the “best” available, because of path dependence in the diffusion 
process induced by network externalities. That is, small accidents early in the choice of 
technologies can lead to the adoption of an inferior standard because the existence of an 
installed base makes that technology more attractive to new adopters. This point was also 
made by Brian Arthur (1989) using probability models of stochastic diffusion processes 
developed by Arthur, Ermoliev, and Kaniovski 1983).  
 
David’s view has been challenged forcefully by Liebowitz and Margolis (1990), on 
at least two grounds: First, they show that the historical evidence that the Dvorak keyboard 
was preferable may be weak. Second, they argue that if society faces large enough costs 
from adopting the wrong standard, it will pay individuals to change the standard via some 
form of collective action.  